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This paper develops a regional hydrologic-ecologic-economic model of groundwater use and a 
nearshore ecosystem. Particularly, we model coastal groundwater management and its effects on discharge, 
nearshore water quality, and marine biota (e.g., indigenous marine algae). We show that incorporating the 
external effects on nearshore resources increases the optimal steady-state head level. Numerical simulations are 
illustrated using data from the Kuki’o region on the island of Hawaii. Two different approaches for 
incorporating the nearshore resource are examined. We find that including algae’s market value directly in the 
objective function calls for lower, albeit slightly lower, water extraction rate in all periods. If a minimum 
constraint is placed on the stock of the keystone species, greater conservation may be indicated. The constraint 
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  In the face of growing water scarcity, groundwater is an important water supply in 
many areas because of its quality and availability. Many attempts have been devoted to 
searching for an optimal groundwater management program. Groundwater management is 
examined extensively by many resource economists including, for example, Renshaw (1963), 
Burt (1964), Brown and Deacon (1972), and Gisser and Sanchez (1980). This group of 
pioneer papers addresses the groundwater allocation problem in the context of the theory of 
the mine, i.e., the aquifer is treated as a bathtub model with a constant rate of recharge. 
However, this might not be the case for coastal groundwater aquifers. 
  The problem of groundwater management becomes more complicated when dealing 
with a coastal aquifer. First, seawater desalination should be added as an additional, albeit 
high-cost source of freshwater, commonly known as a “backstop” resource. (However, as we 
shall see, the abundant resource may also be used to facilitate replenishment of an 
excessively depleted aquifer.)  
A second complication regards the natural discharge from an aquifer into the sea. The 
discharge depends on the amount of groundwater stock; the higher the stock, the higher the 
discharge, due to the effects of water pressure and ground/surface water interaction. This 
special characteristic requires a model that allows for endogenous net recharge. The coastal 
groundwater problem, then, is analogous to the prototypical renewable resource management 
where natural growth is a function of its own stock. Endogenous net recharge is introduced in 
groundwater modeling earlier, for example, by Tsur and Graham-Tomasi (1991). The 
existing endogenous recharge models of groundwater management, however, focus only on 
the effect of groundwater stock on the change in groundwater net recharge (i.e., the higher the groundwater stock, the more groundwater discharges into the sea). The external effects of 
groundwater discharge have not been mentioned in the economic literature.  
  Groundwater discharge (also called “submarine groundwater discharge”) has many 
impacts on nearshore environs, e.g., nutrient loads, temperature, or salinity (Johannes 1980, 
UNESCO 2004). These disturbances may significantly alter the coastal ecological system, 
endangering unique plants, and animal species with ecological or economic value. In this 
paper, we are interested particularly in the effects of water quality on Hawaiian indigenous 
marine algae (also called “limu” in Hawaiian), which is known to be a keystone species of 
the nearshore ecosystem (Abbott 1978). Some scientific studies examining the effects of 
water quality on marine algae have been done. For example, Wong and Chang (2000) study 
the effects of salinity on growth of the commercially important red algae. They find that 
growth rates for red algae reach their maximum with salinity level 20-25 ppt and decline as 
salinity increases. Since average seawater salinity is around 30-35 ppt, this implies that an 
increase in salinity, may induce less growth of the red algae. Although there are many 
scientific studies in this topic, the links between groundwater discharge and the growth of a 
specific marine alga have not been examined in any previous literature. 
  In the next section, we provide a regional hydrologic-ecologic-economic model 
concerning the interaction between groundwater use and the nearshore ecosystem. Although 
the model is generalized so that it is applicable to any coastal aquifer system with valuable 
nearshore resources, particular interest is paid to the Hawaii’s coastal ecosystem. 
Incorporating the possibility of using desalinated water either as a backstop resource or as a 
resource that can facilitate replenishment of an excessively depleted aquifer, the time paths of 
water extraction for different cases are analytically discussed. We show that, considering the value of limu, the aquifer’s head level must be maintained at a higher level than otherwise in 
the steady state. Desalinated water will be used only when the shadow price of water in the 
absence of desalination exceeds the cost of desalination. 
  Section 3 illustrates the model with a numerical example using the data from Kuki’o 
area (North Kona Coast, the Island of Hawaii). Two different approaches incorporating limu 
consideration are discussed. The first approach is to include the market value of limu in the 
model. This results in the lower groundwater extraction rate, albeit the difference is small as 
the market value of limu is relatively insignificant compared to the water value. The other 
approach is to impose a “safe minimum standard” level for limu stock as a constraint. The 
simulation shows non-monotonic paths of water extraction and head level in the optimal 
solution for the constraint case. The conclusions are in section 4. 
2. The Model 
  The model structure applied here follows closely to the one in Krulce, Roumasset, 
and Wilson (1997). Let p(xt) represent the price of water, which depends on the total amount 
of water used (xt). At any time t, qt amount of water is extracted from the aquifer. The 
extraction cost increases when the head level is lower because the water must be pumped a 
farther distance and, in some cases, the water may become brackish and need to be 
desalinated. The marginal cost of water extraction is assumed to be a positive, decreasing, 
and convex function in the head level, i.e.,  ,  0 ) ( ≥ h c 0 ) ( ' ' , 0 ) ( ' > < h c and h c .  
  We assume that an abundant but expensive alternative freshwater source exists. For 
example, freshwater can be produced by seawater desalination. This is a special feature when 
dealing with coastal groundwater management, as seawater is abundant in the area. We denote  p as the fixed cost of producing water from desalination, and bt is the amount of 
water produced by desalination technology at time t.  
  The change in the head level of aquifer is explained by natural recharge (R), amount 
of water extracted (q), and the water discharge to the ocean (l). The recharge is assumed 
constant; or in other words, the average rainfall is fixed over time. As the head level 
increases, water pressure and surface area from which water can leak increase. Thus, there is 
more water discharging from aquifer into the ocean when the head level is high. We model 
discharge as a positive, increasing, convex function of head level, i.e.,  , 
. The state of the aquifer can be explained as:  , 
where  is a conversion factor converting volume to height.
0 ) ( ≥ h l




  Assume that, at any time t, limu is harvested at rate mt; and pm(m) is the price of limu, 
which depends on the amount of limu consumed. As the stock level decreases, it is more 
difficult to find and harvest the limu. The marginal cost of harvesting limu is assumed to be 
positive, decreasing, and convex with the stock of limu (S), i.e.,  ,  , and 
. Natural growth of limu depends on the size of its own stock and water quality, 
G(S,W). With respect to its own stock, the growth is assumed to have the traditional 
properties; strictly concave and attaining a maximum at a finite value of S. Examples of the 
water quality indicator, which may effect the growth of limu, are salinity, nitrogen, and 
temperature. These indicators are related to the amount of freshwater discharged, W=W(l(h)). 
From these relationships, the natural growth of limu can be expressed in terms of limu stock 
0 ) ( ≥ S cm 0 ) ( ' < S cm
0 ) ( ' ' > S cm
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a  is specific to the site. It depends on the shape (e.g. length and width), and the porosity of the aquifer.  and head level, g(S,h). Assume further that freshwater positively affects limu growth, 
gh(S,h)>0. The change in limu stock over time is explained by:  .   m h S g S − = ) , ( &
In the first-best world, a social planner maximizes net social benefit by choosing the 
paths of groundwater extracted, desalinated water, and limu harvested. However, in the real 
world, controlling the amount of limu harvested may be difficult administratively and 
politically. We assume that the government does not have control over limu harvesting. The 
limu is considered an open access resource, which implies that it will be harvested until its 
price equals the extraction cost pm(m)=cm(S). The social planner’s problem is to choose the 
paths of groundwater extraction and desalinated water in order to maximize the social net 
benefit, which is equal to consumer surpluses, derived from water and limu consumption, 








t t m m t t t
rt
b q
dt m S c dy y p b p q h c dx x p e
00 0
,
] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( [ max  
] ) ( [ . . t t t q h l R a h t s − − = &  
          t t t t m h S g S − = ) , ( &
Suppressing time subscripts, the current-value Hamiltonian is:
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where  0 ≥ λ is the co-state variable of the groundwater stock, in terms of the head level, and 
0 ≥ θ  is the co-state variable of the limu stock. The corresponding first-order conditions are: 0 ) ( ) ( ≤ − − + =
∂
∂
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The transversality condition is given by: 
0 ) ( ) ( lim =
∞ → t h t
t λ         ...    (6) 
Since  , and  0 ) ( ' < = x p H
i iq q 0 ) ( ' < = x p H
i ib b , H is maximized. Equations (2) to (5) express 
the optimal conditions of water and limu management. Equation (2) explains that, at the 
optimum, whenever groundwater is extracted, its marginal user cost (MUC) must be equal to 
royalty (price minus extraction cost). Equation (3) implies that the desalination technology 
will not be introduced when the price of water is lower than the cost of desalination. When 
desalinated water is used, the price of water is equal to the cost of desalination. Equation (4) 
can be rearranged as: 
) , ( ) ( ' ) ( ' h S g q h c h al r h θ λ λ λ + − = + &       …   ( 7 )  
Equation (7) explains that the marginal cost of water conservation (the left-hand side) should 
be equal to the marginal benefit (the right-hand side). The cost of water conservation consists 
of the forgone interest from royalty and the monetary value of increased discharge if the 
water is not extracted. The marginal benefits of water conservation include the change in 
royalty, the decrease in extraction cost, as the head level is higher, and the benefit of water 
conservation on limu growth. The equality between the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of water conservation must be hold for all time. Equation (5) has the same interpretation 
as equation (7), but in terms of limu conservation. The condition requires the equality 
between the marginal cost of limu conservation and the marginal benefit.
3
  
  Without desalination, the steady state head level can be obtained by solving the first-
order conditions given that b=0,  0 = p &  ,   (q=R-l(h)), and  . The optimal condition 
at the steady state can be written as: 
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Assuming that   the derivative of the right-hand side of (8) with respect to the 
head level is unambiguously negative (see appendix A). Since the derivative of the left-hand 
side is positive, the steady state head level that solves equation (8), h*, is unique.  
, 0 ) , ( ≤ h S ghh
  However, if desalination technology is available, it will be introduced when the water 
price is high enough (i.e., when the shadow price of water in the absence of desalination 
exceeds the cost of desalination). From equation (3), when desalination technology is used, 
water price will be constant and equal to p . Substituting  p  for p into equation (2) and 
solving with equations (4) and (5), the steady state condition when desalination is used can 


















     …  (9) 
As the left-hand side of equation (9) is constant and the derivative with respect to h of the 
right-hand side is negative (see appendix A), a head level solving equation (9) is unique 
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 In this case, marginal benefit and marginal cost of limu conservation are not controlled by limu extraction 
directly. However, the groundwater extraction path should be such that this condition is satisfied.  (called hb*). Thus, when desalination is being used, the head level will be maintained 
constant at its optimum, hb*. The optimal groundwater extraction is equal to qb*=R-l(hb*).  
Proposition 1: The steady state head level is increasing with the value of the limu. 
Proof: See appendix B. 
  Proposition 1 indicates that the steady state head level must be maintained at a higher 
level if demand for limu increases. For example, when there is no externality, the last terms 
on the right-hand side of equations (8) and (9) disappear ( 0 = θ ). Since the last terms are 
positive, h* and hb* that solve equations (8) and (9) are lower when there is no externality.  
  The use of desalination technology depends on the demand for water and the 
extraction cost. If groundwater is available to satisfy demand without drawing the aquifer 
down to hb* (i.e., h*> hb*, or p*< p  ), desalination will never be applied. In that case, the 
head level will remain at h* in the steady state. On the other hand, if h*<hb*, the desalination 
will be used at the steady state. The steady state head level will be at hb*.  
  The optimal extraction and price paths can be derived by solving equations (2), (4), 


















   …  (10) 
The optimal condition in equation (11) requires the equality between the marginal benefit of 
water extraction and the marginal cost, which consists of the extraction cost and the MUC. 
The MUC is composed of the forgone benefit from the higher future price, the higher 
extraction cost in the future, and the external cost of using water on the limu. 
  From the equation of motion of the head level and equation (11), we can draw phase 
diagrams explaining the dynamic paths of the head level and water price in different cases (figure 1). The   locus implies  0 = h & ) (h l R q − = . As the discharge function is increasing and 
convex with the head level, and the price is decreasing with water used, the   locus is 
increasing with the head level. For the 
0 = h &
0 = p &  locus, if the desalinated water is used in the 
steady state, the   locus is a vertical line at hb*. If desalination is not used in the steady 
state, the   locus will have a negative slope (according to equation (8)).  
0 = p &
0 = p &
 
  From figure 1, given initial head level (h0), there will be an optimal amount of 
extraction that will yield a monotonic optimal time path of head level and water price (and 
thus water extraction) for both cases. If the initial head level is higher than the steady state 
level and h*<hb* (figure 1 (a)), the price rises (extraction decreases) until it reaches the 
desalination cost, then desalinated water will be produced.  However, if h*>hb* (figure 1 (b)), 
the price of water rises (water extraction decreases) and reaches the steady state; desalination 
will not be used. The problem is more complicated if the initial head level is lower than 
steady state. In that case, if p*>  p  and h*<hb* (figure 1 (a)), desalination will be used from 
the beginning until the head level reaches the steady state (hb*). If, however, h*>hb* and p*< 
(a) h* < hb*  (b) h* > hb* 
p 




h & = 0 
p & = 0 
p 
h  h* 
h & = 0 




Figure 1. Phase-diagram showing the dynamic paths of head level and water price. p  (figure 1 (a)), then the desalinated water will be used in the beginning. Desalination will 
be stopped when the price of water is lower than desalination cost. In this case, desalination 
will be used only in the beginning period (so called “frontstop”). 
3. Application 
  In this section, we provide a numerical example of groundwater management model 
considering its nearshore externalities. We choose the Kuki’o area, located along the North 
Kona cost of the island of Hawaii as a study site. Unless stated otherwise, the data used in 
this example is based on the study by Duarte (1995) 
3.1. Data  
Aquifer state equation 
  Like other coastal aquifers in Hawaii, Kuki’o aquifer exhibits a basal or Ghyben-
Herzberg lens (Duarte 1995). It can be thought of as less-dense freshwater floating on an 
underlying heavier saltwater (see figure 2). The amount of water stored in the aquifer is a 
function of head, aquifer boundary, as well as aquifer porosity. Duarte (1995) solves the 
relationship between the volume of basal lens and the head level using a sharp-interface 










h − − = =
θ θ
& &     …  (20) 
where θ is the porosity; W is the aquifer width; and L is the aquifer length. 
WL θ 41
2000
 is a 
conversion factor converting the volume (thousand cubic meter per year, tm
3) to height (m). 
For the Kuki’o aquifer, the porosity is 0.3; the aquifer unit width is 6000 m.; and the aquifer 
length is 6850 m. The state equation for the Kuki’o aquifer can be written as  ) ( 00000396 . 0 t t t q l R h − − = & . For notational convenience, the water (e.g., recharge, 
discharge, or extraction) is presented in units of “thousand cubic meter per year” (tm
3/y).   
Figure 2. Ghyben-Herzberg lens (Mink 1980) 
Recharge and discharge 
  In this paper, we assume away the fluctuation in the net recharge. The average net 
recharge for the Kuki’o aquifer is equal to 15114 tm
3/y. Based on Darcy’s law, Mink (1980) 
derives the structural expression for discharge as a function of the head level. He shows that 
the relationship can be expressed by: 
2 ) ( kh h l =         …   ( 2 1 )  
where k is a coefficient specific to an aquifer. Due to a lack of data on current discharge, we 
assume that the aquifer has been drawn down (head level decreases) with the current 
extraction rate, while it will be built up (head level increases) if no water is extracted. Under 
these assumptions, the value of k ranges from 4584.34 to 4935.18.  For the purpose of 
illustration, the discharge function is assumed to be:   
2 4800 ) ( h h l =
Cost of water   The costs of extracting groundwater are primarily due to the cost of energy needed to 
lift water to the ground level. The unit pumping cost ($/m
3) can be expressed as: 
c = (hgrd – h) EC 
where hgrd is the ground elevation (m), EC is the energy cost of lifting one unit of water per 
meter ($/m
3/m). For the Kuki’o case, hgrd = 403.2 m. With the energy cost at $0.21/ KWH for 
the North Kona area, EC=0.00083. Thus, the unit cost of extraction can be expressed as c = 
0.00083(403.2 – h). At the current head level (h=1.75), water extraction cost is equal to 
$0.33/m
3.  
  Pitafi (2004), using 2001 data , estimates the unit cost of desalination and 
transportation of the desalted water to the existing water distribution system at $7 per 
thousand gallons. Adjusted for the inflation rate (Department of Business, Economic 
Development, and Tourism, 2006), we estimate the cost of desalination to be $7.7 per 
thousand gallons in 2005 price ($2/m
3).   
Demand for water 
  This paper models the demand for water with a linear demand function:  
pt= a - bqt. For the tractability and simplicity, we assume that there is no growth in demand. 
The current pumping rate for the Kuki’o aquifer is 1074.4 tm
3/y (540 gallons per minute). 
The Public Utility Commission price (retail price) for water in the region is $1.27 /m
3 ($ 4.80 
/ 1000 gallons). However, the water use is expected to increase to 3809 tm
3/y, following the 
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 One may think of this as an average of the long-run growing demand.   Griffin (2006) reviews studies on the elasticity of demand for water. He examines the 
results in Dalhuisen et al. (2003) and concludes that the long-term residential price elasticity 
is approximately -0.7 (Griffin 2006, p.309). According to the projected water use, price, and 
elasticity, the demand for water can be estimated as pt= 3.1 – 0.00048qt. The corresponding 
consumer surplus is expressed by 1000(3.1qt – 0.00024qt
2).  
Salinity 
  At the current level of discharge, the average coastal seawater’s salinity around the 
area is approximately 31 ppt (parts per thousand). We assume that if there is no discharge, 
the salinity level will be at the average level of seawater (36 ppt). Assuming that salinity is 
linearly related to discharge, the relationship can be expressed as: 
sal = 36 – 0.00033 l   
Limu 
  In this paper, we choose “limu kohu” (Asparagopsis taxiformisas) as the species of 
concern (see figure 3). This is simply because limu kohu is found in the area of Kona coast, 
its data is available, and it has market value. In 2001, the market value of limu kohu is the 
highest among all limu (Department of Land and Natural Resources, 2001). In Preskitt 
(2002), limu kohu is explained as: 
“Plant has creeping basal portion from which soft, fuzzy uprights grow. 
Found on edges of reef in areas of constant water motion. Only uprights are 
collected; plants are rinsed thoroughly, soaked overnight, then lightly salted. 
Upper branches are pounded and rolled into balls the size of a walnut for 
indefinite storage. Used in small quantities as flavor is penetrating. Added to 
poke, lomi, and stewed beef. Favorite limu of most Hawaiians.”  
Figure 3. Limu Kohu (Preskitt, 2002) 
  According to the Department of Land and Natural Resources (2001), around 1,060 kg 
of limu kohu were commercially picked in the State of Hawaii (all islands), with a total value 
of $19,291. The price of limu kohu is approximately $18.2/kg. In The same report shows that 
15.3% of sea landing (all species) comes from the Island of Hawaii and that out of that 
amount, 9.5% comes from the area between Keahole to Kawaihae, which is the area of our 
interest. Applying these ratios to the limu harvest, I infer that 15.4 kg of limu kohu were 
harvested from this area in 2001.
5
  
  Due to the lack of data on the stock of limu, we assume that the initial limu stock is 
100 kg (one can think of 100 as an index number). The natural growth function of limu is 
assumed to be in the logistic form, where natural growth depends on the net proportion 
growth rate (α) and the carrying capacity level (Scc), i.e.,  S Scc S g ) / 1 ( − =α . We assume 
                                                 
5
 The actual number of limu harvest maybe different due to two factors. First, because limu is not commercially 
harvested extensively in the area, the actual number may be lower. This is because the proportion data used here 
represents an all-species harvest, not only limu. Second, including the non-commercial harvest, the actual total 
harvest must be higher than the commercial harvest alone. With limited data, I assume here that the total harvest 
is equal to 15.4 kg/year. that the carrying capacity of limu depends directly on the salinity level
6
 and can be explained 
by  . For example, at the current level of salinity, the carrying capacity of 
limu is twice that of the current stock, i.e., 200 kg. The growth rate of limu also depends on 
the salinity level of the water. We assume further that at the current salinity (31 ppt), 100 kg 
of limu yields 15.4 kg of limu per year (i.e., at the current harvest rate and salinity level, the 
stock of limu does not change). Studies by Hoyle (1976) and Wong and Chang (2000) 
indicate that the growth rates of limu approximately decrease by 50% when salinity increases 
from 31 ppt to 40 ppt. Assuming that the growth rate is linearly related to the salinity, we can 
write the function explaining the annual increase in limu as: 
. 
) / 31 ( 200 sal Scc =
S Scc S sal g ) / 1 )( 0172 . 0 8412 . 0 ( − − =
  Marasco (1974) reviews the elasticity of demand for fish in the U.S. He finds that the 
elasticity ranges from -0.65 to -0.23. We believe that the elasticity for demand of limu should 
be more elastic because it is less necessary in terms of the human consumption. However, 
limu is widely consumed and is a part of culture in Hawaii. This will make the demand more 
inelastic. For purposes of illustration, we assume that the elasticity of demand for limu is -0.4. 
The linear demand function for limu kohu in the area is, then, expressed by: pm = 63.63 – 
2.95 m.  
  For the cost of harvesting limu, we assume that if the limu is abundant, it requires 0.5 
hour to harvest 1 kg of limu. With the open-access assumption (S=100, cm=18.2) and the 
minimum wage rate at $7.25 per hour, the unit cost can be written as:  25 . 7
201
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 The carrying capacity concept applied here can represent the competitiveness among different species. When 
salinity is high, invasive algae can grow better than indigenous algae. Thus, the carrying capacity of the 
indigenous specie decreases as salinity increases. This effect is separated from the direct effect of salinity on the 
growth rate.     The parameters and functions used are presented in table 1 and table 2 respectively.  
Table 1. Parameters used in the model 
Parameter Explanation  [units]  Value 
θ  Porosity [-]  0.3 
W  Aquifer width [m]  6000 
L  Aquifer length [m]  6850 
R0  Net Recharge [tm
3/y] 15114 
L0  Current discharge [tm
3/y] 14700 
h0  Initial head level [m]  1.75 
hgrd  Ground elevation [m]  403.2 
EC  Energy cost of lifting 1 m
3 of water up for 1 m. [$/m/m
3] 0.00083 
p   Desalination cost [$/m
3] 2 
q0  Current water extraction rate [tm
3/y] 1074.4 
qp  Projected water use [tm
3/y] 3809 
p0  Current water price [$/m
3] 1.27 
η  Long-term elasticity of demand for water [-]  -0.7 
sal0  Current salinity level [ppt]  31 
S0  Initial limu stock [kg]  100 
Scc0  Current limu carrying capacity [kg]  200 
m0  Current limu harvesting [kg/y]  15.4 
pm0  Current limu price [$/kg]  18.2 
ηm  Elasticity of demand for limu [-]  -0.4 
r  Discount rate [%]  3 Table 2. Equations used in the model 
Function Equation 
Aquifer state equation  ) ( 00000396 . 0 t t t q l R h − − = &  
Discharge function  2 4800 ) ( h h l =  
Unit cost of water extraction   c = 0.00083(403.2 – h) 
Water demand  pt= 3.1 – 0.00048qt 
Salinity level  sal = 36 – 0.00033 l   
Natural growth function of limu  S Scc S sal g ) / 1 )( 0172 . 0 8412 . 0 ( − − =  
Limu demand  pm = 63.63 – 2.95 m 
Limu harvesting cost 
25 . 7
201









3.2. Scenario Description 
  Using the above data, we can calculate the optimal water extraction rates, price paths, 
head levels, and other variables of interest for different scenarios. This paper uses Excel’s 
Solver to solve the dynamic optimization problems. We start by solving for optimal water 
management without limu consideration (O). Then, the optimal water extraction rates, taking 
into account the value of limu, are derived (L). However, the value of limu in the calculation 
represents only the value for consumption, ignoring the ecological and cultural value. 
Realizing that the consumption value of limu may not adequately capture its importance, we 
alternatively model the limu concern by imposing a minimum constraint on the level of limu 
stock. Particularly, the stock of limu is restricted such that it cannot be depleted by more than 
a certain percent of the current level. The minimum stock constraint can also be thought of as a “safe minimum standard” corresponding to the precautionary principle. The precautionary 
principle is commonly suggested by ecologists and environmental economists as a principle 
dealing with the problem of species loss, which involves ecological complexity and 
irreversibility (Harris 2005, p.147). For example, Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) show 
that the higher scientific uncertainty about future risk is, the higher prevention society should 
take.
7
 In this paper, we run the simulations with three different levels of constraint on 
minimum stock of limu. Three scenarios include the restrictions that limu stock has to remain 
at least 50% (L50), 75% (L75), and 90% (L90). Table 3.3 summarizes the scenarios and their 
explanations.  
Table 3.3. Description of the scenarios 
Scenario Description 
Baseline (B)  Using current extraction rate for all time 
Projected (P)  Using projected extraction rate for all time 
Optimal (O)  Optimization without limu consideration 
Limu (L)  Optimization considering the value of limu 
Limu 50 (L50)  Optimization with the constraint that limu stock has to remain at least 
at 50% of the current level (cannot be depleted by more than 50%) 
Limu 75 (L75)  Optimization with the constraint that limu stock has to remain at least 
at 75% of the current level (cannot be depleted by more than 25%) 
Limu 90 (L90)  Optimization with the constraint that limu stock has to remain at least 
at 90% of the current level (cannot be depleted by more than 10%) 
 
                                                 
7
 Mathematically, they show that precautionary principle (as defined by previous prevention effort) is an 
optimal policy iff the inverse of marginal utility is concave.  3.3. Results 
  For most scenarios, we present the optimization results for 100 years.
8
 However, due 
to the increase in the number of constraints and the limitation of the optimization software, 
the results of the L90 scenario will be shown for 80 years. If there is no groundwater 
extraction, the groundwater aquifer will be built up and reach the steady state at 1.77 m in 14 
years. The salinity level is 31.01. Limu stock increases to 101.07 kg. With the current 
groundwater extraction rate, the steady state head level will be at 1.71 m, lower than its 
current level. It will be reached after 32 years. The salinity level increases from 31 ppm to 
31.37 ppm, while the stock of limu decreases from 100 kg to 90.4 kg. However, with the 
projected extraction rate, the head level will be drawn down to its steady state, 1.54 m, after 
50 years. The salinity level increases to 32.27 ppm, and the stock of limu decreases by almost 
half (to 55.9 kg) in 100 years.   
  The optimal water management without the limu consideration involves high 
groundwater extraction rates. The extraction rate starts from 5763.67 tm
3/y and slightly 
decreases to 5763.06 tm
3/y in 100 years. The price increases very slightly from $0.3334 to 
$0.3337 per m
3. As the price is always lower than the cost of desalination, desalination will 
never be exercised. The steady state head level in the optimal scheme is 1.40 m and will be 
reached in 65 years. The salinity level increases to 32.91 ppm, while the stock of limu 
decreases considerably to 46 kg in 100 years.  
 
                                                 
8
 Because the numerical example is illustrated by using a finite time simulation, I encounter the problem of 
extensive resource exploitation near the end period. In order to avoid the problem, I run the model with various 
lengths in order to confirm that each scenario reaches its steady state. I find that the steady state is reached 
within 100 years in all scenarios. In most cases, the model is run for 200 years. The results from first 100 years 
are reported.  3.3.1. Accounting for the value of the stock externality 
  Accounting for the value of the limu stock, optimal extraction rates are slightly lower 
than those of the case without limu. In this case, the extraction rate starts from 5763.64 tm
3/y 
and decreases to 5763.04 tm
3/y in 100 years. The steady state head and salinity level, 
however, are the same as in the previous case. The stock of limu is equal to 46 kg after 100 
years. With the lower extraction rate, the price of water is only slightly higher than that of the 
case without limu. Figures 4 to 6 show the time paths of extraction rate, head level, and limu 




















































Figure 5. Time paths of the head level 
 















Figure 7. Time paths of the water price 
 
  From the above results, there are some interesting points that should be mentioned. 
First, the optimal extraction rate is higher than the projected or current water use. This 
implies that the current and projected water use is too conservative. It is possible to increase 
the welfare by extracting more water. This may be partially explained by the fact that the 
well is currently operated by a private owner. The monopoly type of market for water may 
explain the lower-than-optimal extraction rate (Perman et al. 2003). Another possible 
explanation is that the demand for water may be overestimated in the lower ranges of price. 
In reality, water demand may not be linearly related to price over its entire range. 
Overestimating the demand for water may result in a high extraction rate. Moreover, this 
paper models the groundwater aquifer as a bathtub, ignoring the potential effects of 
extraction rate on the unit extraction cost (e.g., ignoring the impacts of the cone of depression 
on the extraction cost). This may explain the high extraction rate found in the simulation.  
  Second, the results show that desalination will never be used in any scenario. As 
mentioned in the theoretical sections, this happens if the desalination cost is more expensive than the steady state water price. In this simulation, the water is enough to satisfy the demand 
with low extraction cost. Since the price of water is always lower than the desalination cost, 
desalination technology will never be used.  
  Another interesting result reveals that the extraction rates with the limu consideration 
are only slightly lower than those in the case where limu is ignored. This is because the value 
of limu is relatively small compared to the benefit of water consumption. However, it must 
be emphasized that the value of limu in this example presents only the consumption value 
and ignores the other values it may have (e.g., ecological or cultural value).    
3.3.2. With safe-minimum-standard constraints on the limu stock 
  Imposing hard constraints on the level of limu stock leads to more conservative water 
management. Given that the stock of limu cannot be depleted by more than 50% (L50), the 
steady state head level is at 1.50 m (compared to 1.40 m from the without constraint case). 
The steady state extraction rate is around 4380.48 tm
3/y. The price of water starts from $0.35 
and reaches $1.00 per m
3 in the steady state.  
  If the limu stock has to remain not less than 75% of the current level (L75), the steady 
state head level becomes 1.65 m, with the steady state extraction rate around 2000 tm
3/y. In 
this scenario, since the groundwater extraction is low, it is optimal to use desalinated water. 
Desalination will be first introduced in year 38, when the price of water is equal to 
desalination cost, $2/m
3. In the steady state, approximately 292 tm
3/y of desalinated water 
will be used.  
  If the limu stock has to be at least 90% of the current level (L90), the steady state 
head level is 1.71 m. The steady state extraction rate is approximately 1064 tm
3/y, while the 
steady state amount of desalination is around 1227 tm
3/y for this scenario (desalination will begin after 17 years). Figures 8 to 12 show the time paths of head level, extraction rate, 
































Figure 8. Time paths of head level with different limu stock constraints 
 



















































Figure 12. Time paths of limu stock with different limu stock constraints 
  
  It is interesting that time paths of the head level, groundwater extraction, desalination, 
and price can be non-monotonic. With the limu constraint, it is optimal to deplete the aquifer 
until the head level is lower than the steady state and then conserve the water later on to fill 
the aquifer until it reaches steady state. Imposing a limu constraint may also induce the use of 
desalination technology (e.g., L75, L90 cases). In the L75 and L90 cases, it is optimal to stop 
using groundwater for some periods. The main results (steady states) from all scenarios are 







 Table 4. Summary of the main results (steady state) from all scenarios 
  B  P  O  L  L90 L75 L50 




1704.4 3809 5763.06 5763.04  1064  2000  4380.48 
Desalination(tm
3/y)  - -  -  -  1227  292  - 
Salinity (ppm)  31.37  32.27 32.91 32.91 31.36 31.67 32.46 
Limu stock (kg)  90.42  55.90 46.01  46.01  90 75 50 
Water price ($/m
3)  -  1.27  0.33  0.33 2  2 1.00 
 
4. Conclusions 
  This paper provides a regional hydrologic-ecologic-economic model concerning the 
interaction between groundwater use and a nearshore ecosystem. We model coastal 
groundwater management allowing for endogenous net recharge (because of submarine 
discharge) and an alternative (abundant but expensive) water source (e.g., desalination). The 
effects of the discharge on the nearshore ecosystem, specifically on the nearshore valuable 
seaweed, are incorporated. To achieve efficiency, water must be extracted such that its price 
equals extraction plus user cost. The externality cost is included in the user cost since the 
externality is determined by the resource stock, not resource extraction. We show four 
possible patterns of water use. It is also possible that the desalination technology will be 
introduced in the first period. Considering the effect on limu, the aquifer’s steady state head 
level must be maintained at a higher level than otherwise. Desalinated water will be used only when the shadow price of water in the absence of desalination exceeds the cost of 
desalination.  
  We numerically illustrate the model using the data from Kuki’o area, located on the 
North Kona Coast of the island of Hawaii. We find that the optimal water extraction rate 
(without limu consideration) is higher than the current or projected one. This implies that the 
current/projected extraction is too conservative; and welfare gains can be achieved by 
extracting more water. This may be partially explained by the fact that the well is currently 
operated by a private owner. The monopoly type of market causes the lower-than-optimal 
extraction rate. Another possible explanation is that the demand for water may be 
overestimated in the lower ranges of price. In reality, water demand may not be linearly 
related to price over its entire range. Overestimating the demand for water may result in a 
high extraction rate. Moreover, in this paper, we model the groundwater aquifer as a bathtub, 
ignoring the potential effects of extraction rate on the unit extraction cost (e.g., ignoring the 
impacts of the cone of depression on the extraction cost). This may explain the high 
extraction rate found in the simulation. 
  In the simulation, two different approaches are applied in order to incorporate the 
limu consideration. The first approach is to include the market value of limu directly in the 
objective function. In this case, the water extraction rate is only slightly lower when the value 
of limu is included. This is because the value of limu is relatively insignificant compared to 
the high value of water. However, it should be emphasized that the value of limu in this 
example accounts only for the consumption value and ignores the other possible values, e.g., 
cultural or ecological value. Desalination technology will never be used because groundwater 
is enough to satisfy the demand.   The second approach, following the precautionary principle and “safe minimum 
standard”, models the limu concern by imposing a minimum stock constraint. We find an 
interesting result that the paths of water extraction, head level, and water price (without 
desalination) are non-monotonic. It is optimal to deplete the aquifer below the steady state 
level, following by a conservation period.  
  Although the model in this paper is developed based on a groundwater-limu 
framework, it is applicable to other cases that share similar structures, for example, 
mangrove-nearshore fishery, or forest-wildlife models. In future work, the model can be 
extended in many ways. For example, in reality, the unit extraction cost may depend not only 
on the head level, but also on the extraction rate (i.e., via the effects from the cone of 
depression). Taking into account the presence of the cone of depression will make the model 
more realistic and thus provide more insight into the actual management problem. One of the 
most interesting extensions is to model the competition among nearshore species. The growth 
of limu does not depend solely on the water qualities, but also on the growth of other species, 
especially fish or invasive limu. Another possible extension is to allow for control on limu 
harvesting. The comparison between open-access and optimal harvest of limu can be done.  
  The analysis in this paper is based on a short-run model, e.g., assuming that the wells 
already exist. The long-run problem of water allocation should involve the location, size and 
time of well-development. In this paper, we focus only on the first-best solutions. There may 
be some other constraints that should be taken into account. For example, for administrative 
purposes or given capacity of water pump limitations, water managers might want to require 
a constant water extraction rate over some periods in practice. Geographical constraints (e.g., 
land subsidence) are also an important issue to consider.  Appendix A.  
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the left-hand side of equations (7) and (8) with respect to h is equal to 
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+ , which is unambiguously 
negative. Appendix B: Comparative static analysis of the steady state head level with respect to 
limu value 
  If desalination is not used, the steady state head level is specified by equation (17), 
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Like the previous case, the comparative static of the steady state head level with respect to 









. In either case (either desalination is used or not), 
the steady state head level is increasing with the value of limu.  References 
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